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WHO CONTROLS LOW -LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES 
Joyce Wheeler Poulin * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the utility industry 
have committed major national resources to the development of 
nuclear energy. Supporters of this pollcy view nuclear power as a 
source of cheap, clean, and inexhaustible energy, and assert that 
scientists have reduced the risk of a serious nuclear accident to a 
tolerable level. I Critics argue that the AEC has exaggerated the 
benefits of nuclear power and understated the risks without inform-
ing the public of the dangers involved. 
The major concern of both proponents and critics has been high-
level radioactive wastes which remain intensely radioactive for 
thousands of years. Low-level wastes, in contrast, have a relatively 
short life span, and can be dispersed into the air and water with less 
danger. Yet, the introduction of low-level wastes into the environ-
ment also poses potentially serious problems.2 Proponents of nuclear 
power have decided that some exposure to low-level radioactive 
wastes is warranted for the development of nuclear energy, even 
though scientists do not know the long-term effects of low-level 
radiation exposure and have not established the threshold for harm-
ful radiation. 3 The lack of evidence on the effects of low-level dos-
ages renders this decision a value judgment. Therefore, it becomes 
important who has the responsibility for formulating the standards 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I The risk is less than one chance in ten thousand. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, ENERGY 
CRISIS IN AMERICA 50 (1973). 
2 The concentration of low-level radioactive wastes in natural food chains can cause grave 
danger to the public health. TOWARDS AN ENERGY POLICY 49 (K. Roberts ed. 1973). 
" In 1960 the Federal Radiation Council adopted exposure guides for radiation in the 
environment. The AEC has followed these standards as maximum individual exposure limits. 
See 10 C.F.R. § 20.106, App. B, Table II (1976). See note 39, infra. 
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for exposure to the public health and environment. 4 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (AEA)5 sought to control nuclear 
development by vesting the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) 
with exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear materials.s Reorganization 
Plan No.3 of 19707 transferred the AEC function of establishing 
generally applicable standards for the protection of the environment 
from radioactive materials to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). In 1972 Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments (FWPCA), 8 which charged the EPA Adminis-
trator with the control of all discharges of pollutants into our na-
tion's waters, and defined "pollutants" to include "radioactive ma-
terials."9 Under the FWPCA, the states would share responsibility 
for the control of pollutants. 10 The FWPCA appeared to conflict with 
the AEA, for these acts charged both the EPA and the AEC with 
regulation of radioactive materials. Moreover, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA) II created an overlap in jurisdic-
tion between the two agencies because NEPA requires the AEC to 
consider the environmental impact of its actions. 12 Thus, the AEC 
had broad regulatory jurisdiction over nuclear materials, with re-
sponsibility for environmental impact. In contrast, the EPA had 
, Lave & Freeburg, Health Effects of Electricity Generation From Coal, Oil and Nuclear 
Fuel, in TOWARDS AN ENERGY POLICY 77 (K. Roberts ed. 1973), stated that "while large doses 
[of radiation] have been found to increase risk of death from leukemia and other cancers, 
as well as the risk of genetic death, little work has been done which gives evidence for effects 
of such low level dosage." Id. 
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 et seq. (1946) (amended 1954). 
, The Atomic Energy Act gave the AEC broad regulatory power over three types of radioac-
tive materials - source, byproduct, and special nuclear material. The AEA did not specifi-
cally characterize the kind of regulatory control the AEC would have over these materials 
which may be dispersed into the waters as pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(z)(aa) (1954). 
7 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. App. at 609 and in 84 Stat. 
2086 (1970). 
, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. V 1975). 
, Id. § 1362(6). 
'" Id. § 1342(a)(b)(c). However, Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota precluded state 
regulation of radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th 
Cir.1971), aff'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). 
12 Prior to 1969 the AEC argued that its obligations were limited to radiation hazards and 
that it would not consider the broader environmental impact. Its position was upheld in New 
Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969). In Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, the appeals court reviewed rules promulgated by the AEC 
pursuant to NEPA, and found that these rules evidenced a "rather thoroughgoing reluctance" 
on the part of the AEC to meet procedural obligations required by NEP A. The AEC had a 
duty to guard against environmental damage to the fullest extent possible at every important 
stage of the decision-making process. 449 F.2d 1109, 1113-19 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
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broad responsibility for the environment, with regulatory authority 
over radioactive materials. 
In Train u. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc. (Colo-
rado PIRG),13 the United States Supreme Court considered the 
question of conflicting agency jurisdiction over discharge of nuclear 
wastes into our nation's waters. Relying on the legislative history of 
the AEA and the FWPCA, the Supreme Court decided that Con-
gress delegated this power to the AEC. In spite of the conflicting 
scientific views on the effects of low-level wastes,14 the AEC identi-
fies the risks to the environment and the public health as insubstan-
tial when compared to the benefits of nuclear power. 15 Therefore, the 
level of AEC regulation of low-level radioactive wastes is likely to 
be less than is necessary to optimally protect the public health and 
the environment. The Court's designation of the AEC as the govern-
ing agency is, then, prognostic of the environmental and health 
effects of low-level radioactive wastes. 
An analysis of the acts, and the agency and court decisions in-
volved in the regulation of radioactive wastes prior to Colorado 
PIRG reveals that congressional intent is inconclusive. The Su-
preme Court could have permitted the EPA to assert itself as the 
agency best-suited to regulate the dispersal of low-level radioactive 
wastes for the benefit of the public health and of the environment. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL PROGRAMS FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 
A. Atomic Energy Act 
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 delegated to the AEC broad regu-
latory authority over source, byproduct, and special nuclear materi-
als. 16 "The paramount concern of Congress was the assurance of the 
common defense and security in the development and utilization of 
nuclear power, since the principal use of atomic energy at that time 
was for military purposes."17 In recognition of scientific and techni-
13 42 U.S. 1 (1976). 
" Green, Radioactive Waste and the Environment, 11 NAT. RESOURCES J. 281, 292·94 
(1971). 
" [d. at 292. See also note 54, infra, for the EPA's criticism of AEC standards. 
" These are radioactive materials that may be dispersed as low-level radioactive wastes 
and constitute virtually all of the radioactive wastes that are of significant concern to water 
quality. See note 77, infra. 
17 Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd 
without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). To this end, the AEC was authorized to supervise the 
development, use, and control of atomic energy, and was vested with ownership of all fissiona-
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cal advances in the development of atomic energy for peaceful pur-
poses, Congress amended the AEA in 1954 to encourage private, 
commercial development of nuclear power. The development, use, 
and control of atomic energy was now to be directed "so as to make 
the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all 
times to the paramount objective of making the maximum contri-
bution to the common defense and security."IR 
The 1954 amendment created a licensing scheme in which the 
AEC would authorize the private ownership of nuclear byproduct 
and the rental of special nuclear material for commercial purposes. 19 
The federal government limited possession of special nuclear mate-
rials to AEC licensees. The AEA authorized the AEC to establish 
such standards "as. . . [it deemed] necessary or desirable to pro-
mote the common defense and security or to protect health or to 
minimize danger to life or property. "20 
Congress adopted further amendments in 1959 to establish the 
respective responsibilities of the states and the AEC in regulating 
source, byproduct, and special nuclear material. 21 Essentially, the 
1959 amendments provided that the Commission would turn over 
to the states, as they became qualified, certain defined areas of 
regulatory jurisdiction,22 including control over radiation hazards.23 
Notwithstanding these agreements, regulatory jurisdiction would 
not be transferred to the states until the AEC determined that the 
state had a program for the control of radiation standards adequate 
to protect the public health and safety. In addition, the AEC could 
retain jurisdiction of certain materials involving special hazards. 24 
In response to criticism of the dual role of the AEC as both a 
ble material, thus creating a government monopoly. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(h) (1946) (repealed 
1964). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (1954). 
" [d. §§ 2131, 2192, 2133. The 1964 amendment permitted private ownership of special 
nuclear material by AEC licensees. 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1964). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1954). 
21 The AEC could not discontinue regulatory authority over special nuclear materials in 
quantities sufficient to form a critical mass. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1959); [1959) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2878. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a) (1959). 
" [d. § 2021(b). 
" [d. § 2021(c). Under this section, Congress excluded the following areas, inter alia, from 
state regulation: construction and operation of production or utilization facilities, including 
reactors; the disposal into the ocean or sea of nuclear materials as defined in the regulations 
or orders of the AEC; and the disposal of such other nuclear materials as the Commission 
determines, because of the hazards or potential hazards, should not be so disposed of without 
a license from the Commission. See also [1959) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2880-81. 
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promoter and regulator of nuclear power, the Energy Reorganization 
Act of 19742;' abolished the AEC and separated the regulation of 
nuclear power from the promotion of nuclear power. The licensing 
and related regulatory functions of the AEC were transferred to a 
new Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) while the operation of 
governmental nuclear research and production facilities were trans-
ferred to the Energy Research and Development Administration 
(ERDA) .26 However, the Act did not expressly assign the regulation 
of low-level radioactive effluents to the NRC.27 
B. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 
The FWPCA authorized EPA regulation of "pollutants" dis-
charged into the nation's waters with the goal of eliminating all such 
discharges into navigable waters by 1985. 2R The Act defined 
"pollutants" to include "radioactive materials"2!1 and defined 
"pollution" as the man-made or man-induced alteration of the 
chemical, physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water.:W 
The Act charged the EPA Administrator with the promulgation of 
uniform effluent limitations for pollutants from particular sources.:11 
Moreover, the FWPCA provided a list of sources for which the EPA 
would establish federal standards. 32 The list included electric power 
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4801 et seq. (Supp. IV 1970). 
" [d. §§ 5841(f), 5842, 5814(c). See also 120 CONGo REc. HI0266 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1974). 
27 Representative Holifield characterized this bill as a traditional government structure bill 
that did not attempt to formulate any policy. 120 CONGo REc. H10268 (daily ed. Oct. 9,1974); 
see note 149, infra. Representative Seiberling attempted to clarify the NRC's role in regulat-
ing radioactive wastes in an amendment defining radioactive materials to include all material 
subject to the licensing and regulatory functions of the NRC. Representative Seiberling 
believed Congress assumed it had already vested the EPA with regulatory authority over 
nuclear wastes in Reorganization Plan No.3 of 1970, but sought to clarify congressional 
intent. Representatives Holifield and Hosmer spoke publicly against the amendment, and 
argued that the bill under consideration would ensure protection of health from radioactive 
wastes by divorcing any regulatory functions of the AEC from promotional ones. 119 CONGo 
REc. H42615 (1973). 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. v 1975). 
" "The term 'pollutant' means dredged spoil, solid waste ... radioactive materials, heat 
.. and agricultural waste discharged into water." [d. § 1362(6). Excepted from this defini-
tion were boating sewage and oil well drilling discharges. [d. The EPA was also charged with 
issuing regulations to control thermal discharges, another waste product of nuclear power 
plants. [d. § 1326. 
III 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (Supp. V 1975). 
:I, [d. §§ 1311, 1312, 1314(b)(h). Effluent standards limit the amount of pollutant that can 
emanate from a particular source. In contrast, ambient standards, a method of enforcement 
prior to 1972, monitor the general quality of the water surrounding a particular source of 
pollutant. See also 118 CONGo REc. S33697 (1972). 
:12 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(l) (Supp. V 1975). 
----------~~ 
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plants without stipulating whether this included electricity genera-
tion by fossil fuel or nuclear power. 
To enforce EPA standards, a nationwide permit program was 
established.33 The FWPCA authorized state administration of per-
mit programs,:l4 and expressly permitted the states to adopt effluent 
limitations more stringent than those established by the EPA. 35 The 
EPA, however, retained the authority to review permits and to re-
voke state permits that did not comply with EPA guidelines. 3s Not-
withstanding the permit program, the FWPCA prohibited the dis-
charge of "any radiological, chemical, or biological warfare agent or 
high-level radioactive waste into navigable waters.":17 
With the passage of the FWPCA, Congress created an overlap in 
jurisdiction. Clearly, this Act charged the EPA with the regulation 
of all pollutants, including radioactive materials. However, the Act 
did not specify whether nuclear power plants were within EPA's 
regulatory power. Reorganization Plan No.3 required the EPA to 
establish standards for environmental protection from radioactive 
materials. The AEA, however, charged the AEC with broad regula-
tory authority over nuclear materials for the national security and 
well-being. Moreover, NEPA required the AEC to consider environ-
mental issues in addition to economic and technical considera-
tions. 3s The development of this legislative overlap in regulatory 
authority over radioactive materials confused the jurisdiction of the 
EPA and the AEC in the regulation of low-level radioactive wastes, 
as well. ~ 
II. AGENCY STRUGGLE FOR REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
The AEC, the first agency to establish radiation standards, set 
the maximum permissible dose of radiation from all man-made 
sources to the general public and the maximum dose to an individ-
ual worker in the nuclear industry.3D The AEC subsequently estab-
"" The permit program urged polluters to achieve "the best practical control technology 
currently available" by July 1, 1977, and the more stringent, "best available technology 
economically achievable" by July 1, 1983. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A). 
'" Id. § 1342(a)(b)(c). 
'" Id. § 1370. 
". Id. §§ 1319, 1342(c). 
:17 Id. § 1311(f). 
". Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1110, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
" See note 3, supra. The yearly, maximum permissible dose to the general public from all 
man-made sources is 0.17 rads; a rad is an acronym for radiation absorbed dose. The maxi-
mum dose for an individual worker in the industry is .5 rems. A rem, roughly equivalent to a 
- -- ---------
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lished regulations requiring nuclear power reactors to "make every 
reasonable effort to maintain ... releases of radioactive materials 
in effluents ... as low as is reasonably achievable"~11 and to keep 
these levels "as low as is reasonably achievable."41 Specifically, the 
AEC established maximum permissible releases of source, byprod-
uct, and special nuclear material into the environment.~2 
On May 22, 1973, the EPA issued regulations to implement the 
permit program of the FWPCA. The EPA Administrator specifically 
excluded nuclear power plants from the permit program upon his 
understanding of the relevant legislative history of the FWPCA: 
The legislative history of the Act reflects that the term 'radioactive 
materials' as included within the definition of 'pollutant' in section 502 
of the Act covers only radioactive materials which are not encompassed 
in the definition of source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials as 
defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulated 
pursuant to the latter Act. Examples of radioactive materials not cov-
ered by the Atomic Energy Act and, therefore, included within the term 
'pollutant' are radium and accelerator produced isotopes. l :l 
Thus, the EPA deferred to the AEC where the jurisdiction of the two 
agencies overlapped. 
This EPA regulation did not resolve the issue of regulatory au-
thority over radioactive materials. 44 Late in 1973, the AEC and the 
rad, is a measure that includes an estimate of the biological impact of different types of 
radiation. "The lowest absorbed dosage at which medically significant damage to humans 
has been observed lies somewhere between 50 and 100 rad, according to some experts. A whole 
body single dose of 100 rad induces vomiting in about 10 percent of people so exposed. A whole 
body single dose of 450 rad causes death to half so exposed." ENERGY CRISIS IN AMERICA, supra 
note 1, at 51. Since these measures are based on a yearly exposure, they do not consider the 
health effects of long term buildup of radioactive materials. 
'" 10 C.F.R. § 20.1 (1976). The term "as low as is reasonably achievable" requires "taking 
into account the state of technology, and the economics of improvements in relation to the 
benefits to the public health and safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, 
and in relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest." [d. § 20.l(cl. 
" [d. § 50.34a. 
" [d. § 20.106, App. B, Table II. See text at notes 44, 92, infra for other radioactive 
materials. However, since the long-term effects of low-level radiation exposure are not known, 
these standards do not consider the buildup of long-lived radionuclides. 
'" 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(y) (1976). The EPA Administrator found this expression of legislative 
intent in the House Committee Report. H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1972). 
See text at note 92, infra . 
.. The Brief for Amici Curiae, 14 Named States, Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. 1 (1976), 
argued that any uncertainty between the establishment of standards by the EPA and the 
implementation by the AEC was resolved by Congress in the FWPCA of 1972 through express 
reaffirmation. 
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EPA issued joint Memoranda of Understanding. J5 Recognizing that 
the agencies had complementary responsibilities in the area of envi-
ronmental protection and the control of radiation, the agreement 
stated that the AEC facilities were subject to generally applicable 
environmental standards established by the EPA. The agencies 
agreed that AEC facilities would be operated in compliance with 
EPA standards, and permitted the EPA Administrator to inspect 
the facilities to verify compliance. However, the memoranda clearly 
stated that such inspection did not imply that EPA could require 
any alterations in the nuclear power plants to meet the EPA stan-
dards. J6 
While these accords between the EPA and the AEC carved out a 
nuclear power plant exemption from the EPA's permit program, the 
EPA was simultaneously trying to control radioactive emissions 
from nuclear power plants through a different mechanism. In Sep-
tember of 1973, the EPA announced plans to publish standards for 
the uranium fuel cycle. 47 These proposed standards were sometimes 
one hundred times more stringent than those of the AEC. The EPA 
claimed that its authority to regulate radioactive emissions derived 
not only from Reorganization Plan No.3, but also from provisions 
of NEP A, 4R FWPCA, and the Clean Air Act. 49 
In response to the EPA's claim, the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) directed the EPA to discontinue its plan to develop 
emission standards for nuclear facilities, "so that the nuclear power 
industry and the general public [would] know where the responsi-
bility lies for developing, promulgating, and enforcing radiation pro-
tection standards."50 The OMB asserted that the "EPA has con-
strued too broadly its responsibilities to set generally applicable 
environmental standards for the protection of the general environ-
ment from radioactive material. "51 In effect, the EPA retained the 
power to set ambient standards for the environment outside of the 
" 38 Fed. Reg. 24936 (1972); id. at 32965; see also 40 Fed. Reg. 19439, n.3 (1975). 
" 38 Fed. Reg. 32965 (1973). 
n [1974] 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 79. 
" See note 11, supra. 
" Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970). Standards, as defined in the Reorganiza-
tion Plan No.3, are "limits on radiation exposures or levels, or concentrations or quantities 
of radioactive material, in the general environment outside the boundaries of locations under 
the control of persons possessing or using radioactive material." [1974] 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
79. See also [1974] 4 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 1729. 
',II [1973] 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1370. 
" [d. 
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nuclear power plant site, but the standards "would have to reflect 
AEC's findings as to the practicability of emission controls"52 for 
particular plants. The AEC would comply with the EPA's ambient 
standards by setting its own effluent limitations for individual nu-
clear power plants. 
In a position paper issued after the OMB memorandum, the EPA 
objected to the narrow interpretation of its authority under Reorg-
anization Plan No.3 and denounced the inadequacies of the AEC 
standards.53 The EPA protested that the OMB directive forced 
abandonment of specific EPA standards which would have set limi-
tations that "over a period of time could have led to significant 
health benefits, [and] would have limited the total amount of long-
lived radionuclides coming out of all parts of the uranium fuel 
cycle."M Obviously, the AEC supported the OMB position and 
stated that generally applicable standards: 
should be developed on the basis of a comparative-risk analysis and a 
general review of the technology, should be based on normal conditions 
of operation rather than accidents, and should be in the nature of am-
bient standards rather than effluent or discharge limitations which are 
directly related to 'hardware' and which are imposed by AEC as an 
integral part of its statutorily required and long established licensing 
process.55 
In the end, the EPA acquiesced in the OMB directive, thereby 
completely deferring to the AEC.58 However, the struggle between 
the EPA and the AEC reflects the confusion between the two 
spheres of jurisdiction and underscores the concerns of each agency. 
52 [d . 
., [The EPA tendered] three reasons: first, control of individual sources of radiation 
under existing guidelines that radiation doses be maintained as far below federal radiation 
protection guides 'as practicable' did not require sufficiently explicit consideration of total 
population dose; second, existing guidance did not deal adequately with the long-term 
impact of the release of long-lived radionuclides into the environment; and, third, a recent 
study by the National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council found that cur-
rent federal radiation protection guides for the average exposure of the population were 
'unnecessarily high.' 
[19741 5 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 79. 
" [1973] 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1370. 
" [1974]4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1729. 
" Colorado PIRG maintained in its Brieffor Respondent at 6, Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 
U.S. 1 (1976), that the "EPA, itself, ha[d) acknowledged that its decision to exclude radioac-
tive materials from coverage under the FWPCA was made at AEC's request ... in spite of 
the rather clear mandate of FWPCA for radioactive materials." 
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III. FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION PRIOR TO COLORADO PIRG 
While Colorado PIRG involved federal agency jurisdiction, prior 
contests of state-federal jurisdiction figured prominently in the leg-
islative history of the FWPCA relied upon in Colorado PIRG. 
Northern States Power Co. u. Minnesota57 held that the AEC's au-
thority to regulate radioactive releases was exclusive and state regu-
lation was precluded. This finding of the AEC's preemption of state 
regulation was central to resolution of the later jurisdictional contro-
versy between the AEC and the EPA. A full consideration of 
Northern States is thus necessary. 
Northern States Power Co. obtained a provisional permit from 
the AEC and applied to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for 
a waste disposal permit. A state permit was issued subject to condi-
tions substantially more stringent than those imposed by the AEC. 
The power company sought a judgment declaring that Minnesota 
had no authority to regulate radioactive waste releases. Although 
the AEA did not expressly grant exclusive federal authority over 
radioactive discharges, the court found an implied grant of this 
authority in the AEC's complete regulation of "construction and 
operation of nuclear power plants."59 
The court pointed out that while the 1959 amendment to the AEA 
permitted surrender of AEC jurisdiction to the states, the amend-
ment prohibited the AEC from discontinuing its responsibility for 
the construction and operation of any production facility. Relying 
on the legislative history of the AEA, the court concluded that this 
responsibility necessarily included the discharge of radioactive ef-
fluents from the facility or plant.60 Dual control by the states and 
the federal government could thwart the intent of Congress to dele-
gate to the AEC the authority to establish the proper balance be-
tween desired industrial progress and adequate health and safety 
standards. 61 The court concluded that the tone of the 1959 amend-
ment relinquishing some control to the states demonstrated 
,,7 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971),a{f'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
" 447 F.2d at 1147. 
" [d. at 1154. 
HI' See note 24, supra. Mr. Lowenstein of the AEC testified before the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, and explained that 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) included the regulation of radioactive 
effluents. "We did not feel that we could begin to cut up that into pieces ... The discharge 
of effluent from the reactor involve many questions relating to the design and construction 
and operating procedures. We did not think it could be considered by itself and broken away 
from the overall responsibility for the reactor operation." 447 F.2d at 1149 n.li. 
" 447 F.2d at 1153-54. 
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"[c]ongressional recognition that the AEC at that time possessed 
the sole authority to regulate radiation hazards associated with by-
product, source, and special nuclear materials .... "112 AEC 
preemption of state regulation of nuclear wastes was firmly estab-
lished.63 Yet, resolution of the state-federal jurisdictional conflict is 
not pertinent to resolution of the AEC-EPA jurisdictional question, 
and should not have figured prominently in Colorado PIRG. 
IV. JUDICIAL DISAGREEMENT OVER AGENCY JURISDICTION 
A. District Court Upholds AEC Authority 
In the federal district court, plaintiffs, Colorado PIRG, claimed 
potential harm from the radioactive effluents from two nuclear 
power plants operated in conformity with AEC standards. Colorado 
PIRG wanted the EPA to regulate the discharge of nuclear materials 
from the Fort St. Vrain facility, a privately-owned nuclear electric 
generating plant, and from the Rocky Flats Plant, a federally-owned 
plant. They sought a declaratory judgment that the definition of 
"pollutant" under the FWPCA encompassed all radioactive materi-
als, including source, byproduct, and special nuclear material, and 
an injunction directing the EPA Administrator to regulate the dis-
charge of all such materials in compliance with FWPCA standards.64 
FWPCA standards would require the EPA to set specific limits for 
each nuclear power plant, yet the EPA Administrator disclaimed 
any authority under the FWPCA.85 
The district court denied the plaintiffs' declaration and injunc-
tion and held that regulation of the discharge of byproduct materi-
als, source materials, and special nuclear materials from a 
privately- or federally-owned plant was within the exclusive juris-
diction of the AEC.88 The court weighed heavily the determination 
" ld. at 1149. 
83 The court thus narrowed the scope of any turnover agreements between the AEC and 
the states. See text at notes 21-23, supra . 
.. Colorado PIRG alleged that initially the EPA had intended to regulate liquid radioactive 
wastes, but then retreated from this position when the EPA and the AEC issued their Memo-
randa of Understanding. The plaintiffs charged the EPA with abandonment of its mandate 
under the FWPCA, and challenged the supporting agreements and the OMB directive. Brief 
for Respondents at 4-5,426 U.S. 1 (1976). The Supreme Court did not consider this prelimi-
nary opinion of the EPA Administrator as indicative of congressional intent, and did not rely 
on the EPA interpretation of the FWPCA in reaching its decision.ld. at 8 n.8. 
" Apparently the EPA Administrator was following the OMB directive at this point. See 
text at notes 50,52, supra.,. ' 
.. Colorado PIRG v. Train, 373 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Colo. 1974). 
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of the AEC and the EPA and rejected claims of AEC incompetency 
or insensitivity to environmental needs and public safetyY The 
court reasoned from the legislative history of the FWPCA that the 
EPA could regulate some radioactive materials,6s but that the AEC 
should retain jurisdiction over the "most highly specialized and 
potentially dangerous area known to our civilization."69 
B. Court of Appeals Overturns AEC Jurisdiction 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit rejected the district court's reliance on the legislative history 
of the FWPCA.70 The court of appeals counseled that the Act, clear 
and unambiguous, defines the term "pollutant," without any quali-
fication, to include "radioactive materials;"71 where Congress in-
tended to create exemptions it was explicit.72 To the court of appeals 
the inevitable conclusion was that the term "radioactive materials" 
means all radioactive materials. 73 While great weight was due statu-
tory construction by an administrative agency, such an interpreta-
tion should not be permitted to overrule the express language of the 
statute.74 Moreover, an analysis of the whole statute demonstrated 
that Congress intended to eliminate all pollution. 
The court of appeals added parenthetically that the legislative 
history of the 1972 Amendments was "conflicting" and 
" The eourt cited Crowther v. Sea borg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969), wherein the court 
applauded the AEC's exercise of "the highest degree of care, caution and expertise to prevent 
any possible damage to life, property and natural resources." 373 F. Supp. at 994. Paradoxi-
cally, the Crowther court stated that the AEC standards as presently established embody a 
risk-benefit analysis which requires a value judgment that should be reserved for politically 
responsive institutions, and not the courts. [d. at 439. 
" Colorado PIRG v. Train, 373 F. Supp. at 994 (D. Colo. 1974). 
'" [d. at 995. Findings in Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437 (10th Cir. 1969) and Northern 
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971) supported AEC retention of 
jurisdiction. The court refused to shut or slow down plants during an energy crisis while new 
rules and standards were adopted by the EPA, insisting that a higher court would have to do 
this. 373 F. Supp. at 995 (dictum). 
711 Colorado PIRG v. Train, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. ]974). 
71 Id. at 747. 
72 507 F.2d at 747. 
7:1 Id. 
" The court noted in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 
]62 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974), that "byproduct, source and special 
nuclear materials constitute virtually all of the radioactive materials that are of significant 
concern to water quality .... " The court viewed the district court's finding that these 
materials are exempt from the FWPCA as a major exception to the Act. If it were the intent 
of Congress to create such a significant exception, the remedy lay with Congress, not with 
the courts. 507 F.2d at 749. 
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"inconclusive."75 Apparently viewing the FWPCA as a later expres-
sion of congressional intent that prevailed over the AEA, this court 
held that the FWPCA authorized the EPA to assume regulatory 
responsibility for all radioactive materials, including source, by-
product, and special nuclear material for the eventual elimination 
of all pollutants into navigable waters. 
C. Supreme Court Validates AEC Jurisdiction 
In the United States Supreme Court,76 the EPA asserted three 
major problems with implementing the decision of the court of ap-
peals. First, the decision significantly impeded efforts to establish 
a nationwide system of nuclear power generation.77 Any fragmenta-
tion of the licensing system prevented uniform and consistent regu-
lations and delayed construction and operation at a time of national 
energy shortages.78 Second, because a nuclear power plant is a unit, 
not simply a group of systems, control over discharges intimately 
affects control over plant design. Third, the decision created uncer-
tainty where certainty and predictability were necessary. Produc-
tion ofa nuclear power plant requires 8-10 years from design to 
construction and operation. The costs range from one-half million 
to more than a billion dollars. "It is extremely important to a utility 
considering whether to undertake such a venture that the standards 
with which the completed plant must comply are accurately pre-
dictable at the outset. "79 
The Supreme Court held that: (1) the "pollutants" subject to 
. regulation under the FWPCA do not include source, byproduct, and 
special nuclear material, and the EPA Administrator had acted in 
accordance with his statutory mandate in declining to regulate the 
discharge of such materials; and (2) the court of appeals erred by 
excluding reference to the legislative history of the FWPCA.80 
The Supreme Court discounted Colorado PIRG's statutory argu-
ment under section 1311(f) of the FWPCAY Colorado PIRG argued 
" 507 F.2d at 748. However, the Court did not base its holding upon this legislative history. 
" 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
77 At the time of the appeal, 116 plants had been licensed by the NRC to operate or to be 
constructed and another 74 applications were pending. 
" Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10-11, 426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
" [d. at 13. 
'II "When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, 
there certainly can be 'no rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may 
appear on 'superficial examination.'" 426 U.S. at 2. 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1311(0 (Supp. V 1975). See text at note 37, supra. 
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that it would be inconsistent for Congress to prohibit the discharge 
of "radiological warfare agents" and "high-level radioactive 
waste, "82 both of which are regulated by the AEA, and not regulate 
the discharge of other AEA-regulated materials within the 
FWPCA's definition of "pollutants." Colorado PIRG claimed that 
this overlap between the AEA and the FWPCA refuted the AEC 
claim that the boundaries between the two statutes were clearly 
drawn and that the AEA has always retained AEC authority for 
nuclear power plant regulation.83 However, the Court held that the 
FWPCA mandate to ban completely the discharge of certain high 
level nuclear wastes regulated under the AEA did not, by itself, 
indicate whether Congress wanted other radioactive materials regu-
lated by the AEA to be subjected to the FWPCA's permit program. 84 
Colorado PIRG then argued that the FWPCA disclaimer phrase, 
"[n]otwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter" before the 
prohibition of warfare agents and high-level radioactive wastes85 
suggested that otherwise these materials would be subject to the 
FWPCA's permit program. The Court noted the strength but not 
the conclusiveness of this argument. Sufficient ambiguity existed in 
the term "radioactive materials" and the "notwithstanding" phrase 
to require examination of the language of the FWPCA against its 
legislative history. 88 
The Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he legislative history of the 
FWPCA speaks with force to the question whether source, byprod-
uct, and special nuclear materials are 'pollutants' subject to the 
Act's permit program."87 The Court concluded that the legislative 
history reflected an intention to preserve the pre-existing regulatory 
plan.88 To conclude otherwise "would have marked a significant 
alteration of the pervasive regulatory scheme embodied in the 
AEA."89 
In its examination of the legislative history, the Supreme Court 
relied heavily upon the House Committee Report's formulation of 
the definition of "pollutants" in the FWPCA.90 Both the House and 
" [d. 
ICI (1974) 4 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 1730. 
" 426 U.S. at 10-11. 
M5 33 U.S.C. § 1311(0 (Supp. V 1975) . 
.. [d. at 11. 
M7 [d . 
.. [d. at 24 . 
.. [d. 
D. [d. at 11; H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). 
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Senate Reports defined "pollutants" to include "radioactive materi-
als, "however, only the House Report expressly excluded source, 
byproduct, and special nuclear material from the definition. 91 The 
Senate Committee Report noted that the FWPCA exempted nu-
clear fuel processing plants from EPA regulation for lack of present 
"technological capability to establish controls for such 
plants .... "92 but observed that the EPA was expected to develop 
that technological capability. Moreover, the Senate anticipated the 
addition of nuclear power plants to the list of sources regulated 
pursuant to the FWPCA.93 
The Senate Committee Report complicated the Supreme Court's 
analysis. The Court allowed that this reference to the development 
of control levels by the Bureau of Radiological Health permitted an 
inference that the Committee contemplated EPA control over the 
disputed radioactive materials. 94 Still, the Court was "not prepared 
to attribute greater significance to this inference than to the more 
explicit statement contained in the House Committee Report, a 
statement . . . amply supported by the discussion on the floors of 
the House and the Senate."95 
This support appeared in a colloquy on the Senate floor between 
Senator Muskie, the primary author of the bill, and Senator Pas-
tore, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Senator 
Pastore asked Senator Muskie if the definition of "pollutant" af-
fected in any way the AEC's regulation of radioactive materials 
under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.96 Senator Muskie responded 
that the FWPCA was not intended to affect the AEA and cited 
Northern States as support. The Court interpreted Senator Mu-
skie's remarks as assurances that the AEC was to retain full author-
ity over materials covered by the AEA: 
The absence of any room for a state role under the AEA in setting 
limits on radioactive discharges from nuclear power plants stands in 
sharp contrast to the scheme created by the FWPCA, which envisions 
" H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 131 (1972). But see S. REp. No. 414, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, 3725. 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1975). See text at notes 130-35, infra. 
'" S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3668, 3725. 
" 426 U.S. at 13. 
" [d. at 13-14. 
" [d. at 14. For the text of the colloquy on the Senate floor, see 118 CONGo REC. S38802 
(1971). 
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the development of state permit programs, . . .and allows the States to 
adopt effluent limitations more stringent than those required or estab-
lished under the FWPCA.97 
The Court relied upon the House consideration and defeat of the 
Wolff Amendment to the FWPCA as another manifestation of con-
gressional intent to retain AEC jurisdiction. At the time the court 
of appeals considered Northern States, the Wolff Amendment 
sought to clarify the states' authority to regulate and limit radioac-
tive materials and thermal discharges more stringently than the 
EP A. 98 The proponents of the amendment assumed that the EPA 
already had this authority and considered the amendment recogni-
tion of states' rights "consistent with the[House] bill's intent to 
place primary responsibility for pollution control in the States."99 
Moreover, the adoption of the amendment would signify that Con-
gress intended the FWPCA to control nuclear and thermal pollu-
tion. lOo 
The House opponents of the amendment strenuously objected "to 
the transfer of the AEC's regulatory authority to the States or to the 
EPA."101 Significantly, most House objections assailed state control 
and argued for uniformity in regulation. 102 Arguably, the EPA could 
provide uniformity and preempt the states as did the AEC. Colo-
rado PIRG argued before the Court that the Wolff Amendment 
pertained only to the states' jurisdictional question, and that its 
defeat did not indicate congressional intent to foreclose EPA regula-
tion of low-level radioactive wastes. 103 
The Supreme Court disagreed with Colorado PIRG and reasoned 
that the amendment would have been superfluous if AEA-regulated 
"' 426 U.S. at 16. See text at notes 34·35, supra. 
" 118 CONGo REC. H10648 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Wolff). This section of the FWPCA 
already permitted the states to adopt effluent standards more stringent than those of the 
EPA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370. (Supp. V 1975). 
" 118 CONGo REc. H10652 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Hungate). 
, .. , Id. at H10654 (remarks of Rep. McClory). 
'0' 426 U.S. at 18. 
'02 One representative objected to the amendment as collateral and therefore improper 
amendment of the AEA. 118 CONGo REc. H10653 (remarks of Rep. Clausen l. However, others 
objected because the AEC had the assured expertise to handle such dangerous material. [d. 
at H10651 (remarks of Rep. Edmondson), beyond the past capabilities of the states. [d. at 
H10650 (remarks of Rep. Holifield). The states' more stringent requirements would stunt the 
growth of the nuclear industry in the midst of the energy crisis. [d. at H10652-53 (remarks of 
Reps. Hosmer and Clausen). Representative Hosmer warned that if Congress "let fifty differ-
ent States set fifty different standards, and fifty different ways of handling radioactive emis-
sions, you will ruin the nuclear industry in this country." [d. at H10652-53. 
'03 426 U.S. at 20. 
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material were covered by the FWPCA as "pollutants" because the 
FWPCA already gave the states the power to set more stringent 
effluent limitations than the EPA.104 Moreover, the Court rejected 
the result that Colorado PIRG sought which would permit EPA 
regulation, and at the same time preclude state regulation of the 
same materials. The Court could discern nothing in the language of 
the FWPCA that would permit this result. 
Finally, the Court concluded that when the Conference Commit-
tee simply retained the same definition of "pollutants" as the House 
and Senate bills without challenging the House Committee Report's 
exclusion of AEA-regulated materials, it tacitly adopted the House 
exclusion. 105 The Court relied on the remarks of Representative Har-
sha, a ranking minority member of the Conference Committee, as-
serting that the Conference Report did not change congressional 
intent revealed in the Muskie-Pastore colloquy. lOB Representative 
Harsha remarked that the Wolff Amendment would have over-
turned Northern States, and "pointed out the necessity of not 
changing the careful division of authority between the States and 
the Federal government over nuclear materials and facilities as 
enunciated in Northern States case .... "107 Representative Harsha 
reported that the Conference Committee adopted the exclusion of 
AEA-regulated materials as previously stated by the EPA Adminis-
trator and in the House Report. loK The Supreme Court concluded: 
"With no one expressing a different view of the Conference action, 
the House proceeded to agree to the Conference Report."109 
In brief, the Supreme Court relied on the House exclusion of AEA-
regulated materials, the floor debate on the state-federal issue, the 
Conference Committee's silence on the import of "radioactive mate-
rials," and Representative Harsha's comments thereto. In a unani-
mous decision the Court held that "radioactive materials" subject 
to regulation under the FWPCA do not include source, byproduct, 
and special nuclear material, all dispersed as low-level radioactive 
wastes from nuclear power plants. 
"" [d. at 21. 
'''' [d. at 22·23. 
,,,. [d. at 22. 
"" [d. See also 118 CONGo REC. H33747-48. 
III' See text at note 92, supra. 
III' 426 U.S. at 23. 
218 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:201 
VI. ASSESSMENT OF COLORADO PIRG AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Seemingly, the legislative history substantiates the Supreme 
Court's pronouncement. However, the House Committee's failure to 
expressly exempt AEA-regulated materials in the language of the 
FWPCA undermines the Supreme Court's rationale and prompts 
another reading of the legislative history, and further analysis. llo 
If Congress wanted to ensure that the FWPCA did not alter the 
AEC's exclusive jurisdiction, Congress could have made its inten-
tions explicit in the Act. Congress was aware that the term 
"radioactive materials" could be read to include AEA-regulated 
materials. The issue was first raised in the Muskie-Pastore Senate 
colloquy in which Senator Muskie stated that the FWPCA did not 
affect the AEA.lll The House Report's express exemption of AEA-
regulated materials from "radioactive materials" demonstrated the 
House's appreciation of the problem. Since Senate consideration of 
the FWPCA preceeded House consideration, this exemption re-
sponded not only to questions raised in the House but also to the 
Senate colloquy. Moreover, in testimony before the House Commit-
tee, several representatives of the utility industry evinced a similar 
concern. They requested that the House bill include a provision that 
materials already regulated under the AEA were not covered by the 
FWPCAY2 Yet, neither the Senate, House, nor Conference version 
of the FWPCA exempted source, byproduct, and special nuclear 
material. ll3 
The Conference Committee had ample opportunity to assess the 
concern of the Senate colloquy and the House Report, and to ensure 
'''' Comment, High Court Concludes Water Act Was Not Intended to Affect Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission's Jurisdiction, 6 ENVIR. L. REV. 10169, 10170 (1976). 
111 See text at notes 24-25, infra. 
"' Hearings on H.R. 11895, 11896 Before the Committee of Public Works, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 774 (1971) (statement of W. Donham Crawford, President of Edison Electric Institute) 
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings). See also id. at 914 (letter to John A. Blatnik, Chairman 
of House Public Works Committee, from William F. Kennedy of General Electric Co.). These 
representatives also suggested entirely removing the phrase "radioactive materials" with 
further clarification of the AEC's exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 914 (statement by Guy M. 
Nichols, New England Electric System). They feared operational delays if the definition of 
"pollutant" without further qualification could be interpreted as giving the EPA and the 
states jurisdiction over AEA-regulated materials. Exclusion of radioactive materials from the 
definition of "pollutant," they argued, conformed to the intent of the Senate as evident in 
the colloquy between Senators Muskie and Pastore. Id. at 891. 
"" See S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 502(f) (1971), reprinted in [1972) U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 3668; H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 502(6) (1972); S. 2770, S. REp. No. 1236, 
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in [1972) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3821. 
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that the FWPCA did not alter the AEC's jurisdiction.lI~ The Confer-
ence Committee did, in fact, alter the definition of "pollutants." As 
enacted, the FWPCA definition of "pollutant" included two express 
exceptions essentially identical to those contained in the Senate 
bill. 115 The Conference Committee rejected the two other exceptions 
proposed by the House,1I6 and eliminated the House and Senate 
provision that the term "pollutant" was "not limited to" materials 
specified in the definition of "pollutants."117 Yet, the Conference bill 
retained the same reference to "radioactive materials" that caused 
confusion in the Senate and the House. Furthermore, the Confer-
ence Report did not incorporate the exemption of low-level nuclear 
wastes found in the House Report. 
The House Report's exemption of materials regulated by the AEC 
is a major exemption, m and should not simply be implied. Because 
the exemption was never written in the House bill, the Senate Re-
port, the Senate bill, or the Conference bill, it should not be consid-
ered persuasive of congressional intent. Committee reports offer lit-
tle evidence of the intentions of the majority of both Houses, 119 
particularly when, as in the present case, an apparent conflict be-
tween the House and Senate reports was not expressly resolved by 
the Conference Committee. 
The Conference Committee's silence is not necessarily an affirma-
tive indication of intent. The fact that the Conference Committee 
did not incorporate the House Report's exemption in the FWPCA 
may just as readily demonstrate rejection of the House position. The 
Committee may have left the ambiguity in deference to the EPA so 
that the EPA could assert its authority wheri it developed the 
"technological capability. "120 
The legislative history, itself, may not be reliable. The legislative 
"' The Conference Committee's consideration of the FWPCA resulted in one of the longest 
conference sessions ever. 118 CONGo REC. H33746 (1972); id. at S33692. 
"' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (Supp. v 1975). Oil drilling was exempted from EPA jurisdiction 
because another agency already had jurisdiction. Administrative problems in the regulation 
of the thousands of motorboats in the U.S. necessitated the second exemption. See note 29, 
supra. 
'16 House exemptions rejected by the Conference Committee were thermal discharges and 
organic fish wastes. S. REp. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 3821. 
"' [d. 
'IK See notes 16 and 77, supra. 
II. Davidson V. Gardner, 370 F.2d 803, 828 (6th Cir. 1966), See also United States V. Rohm 
and Haas Co., 500 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975), 
1211 See text at note 94, supra. 
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history may have been manipulated by members of the Joint Com-
mittee of Atomic Energy.121 Colorado PIRG argued that these mem-
bers, unable to obtain an express exemption of AEA-regulated ma-
terials, sought to achieve this result indirectly through the legisla-
tive history.122 Both Senator M uskie's and Representative Har-
sha'sl23 comments as to the effect of the FWPCA on the AEC's 
jurisdiction were prompted by members of the Joint Committee. 
Certainly members of the Joint Committee, responsible for the AEA 
and congressional regulation of nuclear energy, wished to secure the 
AEC's jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, much of the legislative history confuses the state-
federal preemption issue with the AEC-EPAjurisdictional question. 
For example, in the Muskie-Pastore colloquy, Senator Muskie cited 
the Northern States case in support of his assertion that the 
FWPCA would not alter AEC regulatory powers. 124 Senator Pastore 
responded that this case was exactly his concern: "As a matter of 
fact, that decision held that the Federal Government did preempt 
in this field under existing law. That is all I am concerned with."125 
From this exchange, the Supreme Court reasoned that the AEC was 
to retain full authority over materials covered by the AEA. The 
colloquy and case, however, may be interpreted as establishing fed-
eral preemption only, without clarifying EPA and AEC jurisdiction. 
Similarly, Representative Harsha's remarks126 were read out of 
context, further confusing the distinction between the state-federal 
issue and the AEC-EPA issue. Harsha was responding to a question 
prompted by Northern States and the Muskie-Pastore colloquy127 
whether the Conference bill changed the division of authority be-
tween the states and federal government under the AEA.128 Repre-
sentative Harsha answered that the original intent as made clear in 
the Senate colloquy, in Northern States, and in the House Commit-
tee Report was unchanged. Harsha stated that AEA-regulated ma-
121 The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has the dual, sometimes conflicting role of 
promoter and regulator, and is, therefore, anxious to create a regulatory scheme least restric-
tive of the development of nuclear power. 
122 Brief for Respondents at 49-51,426 U.S. 1 (1976). 
IZI Representative Harsha directed his remarks in answer to a question posed by Represent-
ative Anderson, a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 
'" 118 CONGo REc. S38802 (1971). 
125 [d. 
12' See text at notes 108-09, supra. 
127 118 CONGo REc. H33747-48 (1972). 
'" See text at notes 124-25, infra. 
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terials were not included in the bill's definition of "pollutant." How-
ever, the question directed to Representative Harsha, the Senate 
colloquy, and Northern States addressed only the role of the states 
in the regulation of AEA materials, not the role of the EPA. 
The Court's inability to distinguish the state-federal preemption 
issue from the AEC-EPA controversy was somewhat understanda-
ble. The FWPCA provides for the development of state permit pro-
grams and allows the states to adopt effluent limitations more strin-
gent than those established by the EPA.129 If the FWPCA's author-
ity extended to AEA-regulated materials, then the states may have 
assumed responsibility for the regulation of radioactive materials in 
contravention of Northern States. Thus the AEC-EPA question 
could affect the federal-state question. 
However, the House recognized the need to clarify the state role 
when it defeated the Wolff Amendment. Arguably, defeat of that 
amendment precluded state regulation of nuclear materials under 
the FWPCA. The federal government could have preempted state 
regulation through the EPA rather than the AEC. On this basis, the 
Court could have vested the EPA with jurisdiction over nuclear 
wastes without upsetting the federal-state relationship outlined in 
Northern States and the Senate colloquy. 
The Senate Report anticipated that the EPA would develop the 
capability to regulate low-level radioactive wastes. 130 Obviously, the 
Senate intended to defer EPA regulation of source, byproduct, and 
special nuclear material only until the EPA developed the necessary 
expertise. 131 The Senate's intent conforms with the Northern States 
finding that the regulatory authority over nuclear wastes was not 
expressly stated in the AEA.132 Only a "congressional feeling" ex-
isted that the AEC possessed the necessary expertise at the time of 
the adoption of the 1959 amendment, and consequently possessed 
sole authority over radiation hazards. 133 Under the Senate Report 
the EPA could have assumed jurisdiction once it developed the 
technical capability to set effluent limitations for nuclear power 
plants as it does for all other industries. 134 The fact that the EPA 
'" 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. V 1975). 
'"' S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (19711, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 3725. 
"" Id.; see text at note 95, supra. 
,:\2 447 F.2d at 1149. 
133 Id. 
,:\, See text at note 95, supra. Such an interpretation would exempt nuclear power plants 
from a permit system administered by the EPA or the states. 
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did try to publish regulations applicable to nuclear power plants in 
1973 demonstrates that the EPA believed it could assume regulatory 
authority. 1:1;' 
Finally, the exemption in the House Report is contrary to the 
accepted meaning of radioactive materials, "any material which 
emits radiation." 136 NRC regulations recognize this definition; 137 
congressional debate over the FWPCA emphasized this definition. 
The Conference Committee could have clarified the definition of 
"radioactive materials" if it intended a meaning other than that 
generally accepted. While the Conference Committee did carefully 
consider the definition of "pollutants," the Committee never quali-
fied "radioactive materials." 
The Conference Committee expressly provided two exemptions to 
the definition of "pollutants."13s When Congress enumerates certain 
exceptions in a statute, presumptively no other exceptions are in-
tended. I :1Y The popular definition of radioactive materials and the 
express inclusion of some other exemptions from the definition of 
"pollutants" indicate that the FWPCA delegated to the EPA regu-
latory authority over all radioactive materials. 
Some of the legislative history suggests that Congress intended to 
exempt source, byproduct, and special nuclear material from the 
definition of "pollutants." However, other legislative history pre-
cludes such an inconvertible exemption. Where such conflict ap-
pears in the legislative history and where such ambiguity confounds 
the definition of radioactive materials, consideration of the broad 
purposes of the FWPCA and the AEA is necessary. 
The major purpose of the FWPCA is to control all "pollutants" 
discharged into the nation's navigable waters.140 Such an expansive 
goal calls for broad construction of the Act. The definition of 
"pollutant" triggers the pollution control mechanisms of the 
FWPCA, and therefore, particularly merits a broad construction. A 
broad construction of "radioactive materials" reinforces the purpose 
of the Act. In contrast, the original purpose of the AEA was singu-
larly directed toward the control of nuclear development for the 
"" See text at notes 47-55. supra. 
II,; 40 Fed. Reg. 23419, 23423 (1975). 
117 10 C.F.R. § 20.3(13) (1976). Radioactive material is defined to include "any such mate-
rial whether or not subject to licensing control by the Commission." [d. 
"IX See note 29, supra. 
"" 2A SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 47.11 (4th ed. 1973). 
"u 3:1 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. v 1975). 
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national security, and later, toward the peaceful development of 
nuclear power. The AEA's concern at all times has been the control 
of critical amounts of radioactive materials in furtherance of the 
national security. Prior to Colorado PIRG, where the FWPCA and 
the AEA overlapped in jurisdiction, the EPA could have asserted 
jurisdiction over low-level radioactive pollutants. 
The struggle for regulatory authority in 1973, culminating in the 
OMB directive, demonstrated that initially it was not clear to the 
AEC and the EPA which had jurisdiction. 141 The AEC thought it 
was exercising the authority it always had, namely imposing 
"radionuclide release limits, dose limits and requirements for im-
plementing such limits."142 The Supreme Court in Colorado PIRG 
supported the AEC's position when it noted that the EPA role was 
not totally negated: 
EPA was to set generally applicable radiation standards, limiting the 
total amount of permissible radiation in the environment from major 
categories of sources, while the AEC was to prescribe the limitations 
applicable to discharges of licensed materials from particular sources 
which contribute to the total. I43 
But requiring the EPA to set standards for the general environment 
conflicts with the control mechanisms of the FWPCA which sought 
to replace less effective ambient standards with stringent effluent 
limitations giving pollution enforcers real leverage over individual 
sources. 144 Moreover, the FWPCA did authorize the EPA to regulate 
thermal pollution which is also integral to the construction and 
operation of a nuclear power plant. 
The contrasting goals of the FWPCA and the AEA cause the EPA 
and AEC regulatory decisions for nuclear wastes to rest on very 
different considerations. The AEC's "low as achievable" guidelines 
are the result of a benefit-risk calculation which weights such fac-
tors as cost and the nation's increasing energy needs over environ-
mental concerns. 145 In contrast, the EPA's calculations were the 
result of a balancing scheme aimed at limiting radiation doses to the 
"lowest feasible levels" for the protection of the public health and 
environment, while maintaining nuclear power plants to benefit 
III See text at notes 45-49, supra. 
112 [1974J 4 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1730. 
IU Train v. Colorado PIRG, 426 U.S. at 24. 
IH [1972J U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3709. 
Il,; [1974J 4 EN VIR. REP. (BNA) 1730. 
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public health and welfare. 146 The EPA's foremost concern is the 
public health and the environment, whereas the AEC's is the growth 
of nuclear power. 147 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court held in Colorado PIRG that the EPA's role 
in protecting the environment from excessive radiation attributable 
to AEA-regulated materials had not been totally negated. 148 The 
EPA still retained the authority transferred under Reorganization 
Plan No.3 to establish applicable environmental standards for the 
protection of the general environment from radioactive material. 
Relying on the legislative history of the AEA and FWPCA, the 
Court resolved that the passage of the FWPCA did not create an 
overlap in jurisdiction. Congress vested in the AEC the exclusive 
regulatory authority for low-level radioactive wastes discharged 
from nuclear power plants. However, an alternate reading of the 
legislative history was possible and disclosed sufficient ambiguity so 
that the Supreme Court could have resolved the jurisdictional ques-
tion in favor of the EPA. 
The effect of Colorado PIRG is that the EPA will not regulate 
radioactive wastes discharged from nuclear power plants. Colorado 
PIRG, however, does not resolve the nuclear power industry's fear 
of multiple sets of review, because the EPA still retains authority 
for thermal pollution. Furthermore, the case creates an inequitable 
exception; the EPA will regulate all industries except nuclear 
power. Past actions of the NRC do not promise that it will act in 
the best interest of the public health and environment. The creation 
of the NRC offered no guarantees that members of the Commission 
would not be committed to nuclear development. 149 In fact, some 
former Commissioners of the AEC joined the NRC.150 Thus, the 
"' [1974] 5 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 79. 
"' Victor Gilinsky, a Commissioner of the NRC, stated that the new NRC "is striving to 
balance the public benefits and public costs of new technology ... to protect the public health 
and safety as it relates to nuclear energy .... " 1 NRC 20, at 5 (June 17, 1975). 
'" 426 U.S. at 24. 
'" The Senate unsuccessfully tried to control the makeup of the new NRC board by requir-
ing fair representation of expertise in nuclear safety technology, health science, and environ-
mental science. [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4943. 
'51' For example, the new NRC was chaired by William A. Anders, former general manager 
of the AEC. [1975] ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 1516. Compare the AEC staff, listed in FEDERAL 
REGISTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1974-75 at 425, with the new NRC staff, listed in 
FEDERAL REGISTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1975/1976 at 550-51. 
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standards for an industry that threatens the nation's health and 
environment may be less stringent than society requires. 
The NRC has not adequately faced the conflict between nuclear 
generation of electricity and environmental and public safety. NRC 
actions have proved to be hasty and unsatisfactory. 151 Nuclear power 
plants continue to be constructed and licensed without any assur-
ance that the wastes problems are solved, or even stringently regu-
lated. Congressional action is overdue. Congress' failure to resolve 
the problem of radioactive materials in concrete statutory language 
endangers the public health and environment. The nature of radio-
active wastes complicates Congress' considerations.152 
Yet, the complexity of nuclear questions need not preclude EPA 
regulation. Rather, the nature of radioactive materials supports ar-
guments for EPA jurisdiction. The setting of standards for nuclear 
materials is a matter of public policy. Congress has a duty to place 
this responsibility with an agency committed to the protection of 
the public health and environment. 
15' See note 54, supra. 
15' See D. ZWICK & M. BENSTOCK, WATER WASTELAND 23-24 (1971) (Nader Report on Water 
Pollution) . 
